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Abstract: The analysis and defence of democracy on the grounds of its epistemic powers is 
now a well-established, if contentious, area of theoretical and empirical research. This article 
reconstructs a distinctive and systematic epistemic account of democracy from Dewey's 
writings. Running like a thread through this account is a critical analysis of the distortion of 
hierarchy and class division on social knowledge, which Dewey believes democracy can 
counteract. The article goes on to argue that DeweyÕs account has the resources to defuse at 
least some important forms of the broader charges of instrumentalism and depoliticization 
that are directed at the epistemic project. The gloomy conviction of the stratified character of 
capitalist societies and the conflictual character of their politics shapes DeweyÕs view of 
political agency, and this article outlines how this epistemic conception of democracy is 
deployed as a critical standard for judging and transforming existing political forms but also 
serves as a line of defence for democratic political forms against violent and authoritarian 
alternatives.   
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Does Dewey have an Òepistemic argumentÓ for democracy? 
 
I. Introduction 
The analysis and defence of democracy on the grounds of its epistemic powers is now a well-
established, if contentious, area of theoretical and empirical research.
1
 Epistemic democrats 
have developed a cluster of arguments to the effect that the wisdom of the many can be 
mobilized by democratic arrangements and that this provides an important defence of 
democracy.  
Within democratic theory, a host of democratic skeptics has unsurprisingly descended 
on this idea, in a broad coalition that encompasses followers of both Arendt and Rawls Ð with 
their distinct projects of driving a wedge between cognitive values such as truth and politics Ð 
as well as agonists and egalitarian proceduralists. From these different perspectives, these 
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1
 For example, Elizabeth Anderson, ÒThe Epistemology of DemocracyÓ, Episteme, 3, nos. 1-
2 (2006): 8-22; Joshua Cohen, ÒAn Epistemic Conception of DemocracyÓ, Ethics, 97 (1986): 
26-38; David Estlund, ÒBeyond Fairness and Deliberation: The Epistemic Dimension of 
Democratic AuthorityÓ in James Bohman and William Rehg, Deliberative Democracy: 
Essays on Reason and Politics (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997), pp. 173-204; David Estlund, 
Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2008), Robert Goodin, Reflective Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 
Jrgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, trans. W. Rehg (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996); 
Jack Knight and James Johnson, The Priority of Democracy: The Political Consequences of 
Pragmatism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011); Jack Knight, Hlne Landemore, 
Nadia Urbinati and Daniel Viehoff, ÒRoundtable on Epistemic Democracy and Its CriticsÓ, 
Critical Review, 28, no. 2 (2016): 137-70; Hlne Landemore, Democratic Reason: Politics, 
Collective Intelligence, and the Rule of the Many (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2013); Josiah Ober, Democracy and Knowledge: Innovation and Learning in Classical 
Athens (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010); Melissa Schwartzberg, ÒEpistemic 
Democracy and Its ChallengesÓ, Annual Review of Political Science, 18 (2015): 187-204. 
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critics argue, as Nadia Urbinati puts it, that epistemic democracy aspires to Òobjective 
standards for the evaluation of social choices that are above political communication and its 
proceduresÓ.
 2
 In doing so, it offers Òa radical attempt to depoliticize democracy by making it 
a chapter in the search for truthÓ. A first question is how an instrumental justification of 
democratic institutions in terms of epistemic capacity sits alongside a non-instrumental 
justification of (for example) procedural equality, or an instrumental justification in terms of 
some other value such as autonomy.
3
 Does the former imply that the latter is only 
instrumentally justified Ð that citizens have political rights only since they can contribute to 
epistemically superior decisions? In spite of the expressed intentions of proponents of the 
epistemic conception, critics fear that epistemic democracy itself promotes a technocratic 
mentality. Plenty of us have doubts about the epistemic capacities of many citizens. We may 
even scoff at them; that is, at each other. This seems to be part and parcel of a democratic 
society. If democracy is valued only instrumentally for producing superior epistemic 
outcomes, these doubts open up space for opponents to mount a case for non-democratic 
forms of rule on the back of criticisms of the cognitive powers of voters and democratic 
systems.
4
 Furthermore, to its critics the epistemic conception of democracy suggests an 
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2
 Nadia Urbinati, Democracy Disfigured: Opinion, Truth and the People (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2014), p. 96. 
3
 In this paper, IÕm bracketing epistemic accounts of democratic authority of legitimacy (for 
which the superior epistemic capacities of democracy provide us with a reason to be bound 
by its decisions) in order to discuss the broader and weaker justificatory claim (the epistemic 
capacities of democracy provide us with a reason to support it). For the former, see Estlund, 
Democratic Authority.  
4
 Cf. Lisa Hill, ÒVoting Turnout, Equality, Liberty and Representation: Epistemic versus 
Procedural DemocracyÓ, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 
19, no. 3 (2016): 283-300; Guido Pincione and Fernando R. Tesn, Rational Choice and 
Democratic Deliberation: A Theory of Discourse Failure (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006). 
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unrealistically cerebral view of politics as a quest to promote the ÒGNT, the gross national 
truthÓ, in one sardonic formulation, which glosses over the passionate assertion of 
antagonistic claims by different classes, interest groups, identities and ideologies.
5
  
John DeweyÕs thought seems to provide a rich set of potential resources for the 
epistemic democrat. He tells us, for example, that: 
The foundation of democracy is faith in the capacities of human nature; faith in 
human intelligence, and in the power of pooled and cooperative experience. It is not 
belief that these things are complete but that if given a show they will grow and be 
able to generate progressively the knowledge and wisdom needed to guide collective 
action.
6
  
However, the contours of DeweyÕs epistemic account, along with the question of whether 
there is an argument of this sort at all in his work, and its implications (if he does have one) 
remain contested. For some interpreters, elements of DeweyÕs work support a view of 
democracy as a collective exercise in practical intelligence, although this is characterized in a 
variety of ways.
7
 According to James Kloppenberg, for instance, DeweyÕs Òdemocratic 
community replicates the community of broadly conceived scientific inquiry that serves as 
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5
 Stephen Holmes, Passions and Constraint: On the Theory of Liberal Democracy (Chicago: 
Chicago University Press), p. 193 (citing Samuel Finer). 
6
 John Dewey, ÒDemocracy and Educational AdministrationÓ, in The Later Works of John 
Dewey, vol. 11, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1987), 
p. 219. 
7
 E.g., Hilary Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 
pp. 180-202; Raymond Geuss, History and Illusion in Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), pp. 124-8; Anderson, ÒEpistemology and DemocracyÓ; Jose Medina, 
J. 2012. The Epistemology of Resistance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Knight 
and Johnson, Priority of Democracy, Landemore, Democratic Reason, pp. 82-5. 
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the prototype of instrumental reasoningÓ.
8
 Hilary and Ruth Anna Putnam identify DeweyÕs 
Òepistemological justification of democracyÓ, in which democracy is Òthe precondition for 
the full application of intelligence to the solution of social problemsÓ.
9
 Elizabeth AndersonÕs 
influential account of the epistemic powers of democracy springs from the belief that 
ÒDeweyÕs experimentalist account of democracy as the collective exercise of practical 
intelligence offers rich resources for evaluating the epistemic powers of particular democratic 
institutions, and for suggesting reforms to improve these powersÓ, particularly in the value it 
attaches to the importance of diversity and challenge in improving social knowledge.
10
 For 
Hlne Landemore, Dewey forms part of her genealogy of epistemic democracy, offering an 
account of how pre-discursive common interests can be clarified and articulated through 
public discussion.
11
  
For skeptics about Dewey as epistemic democrat, including, for example, such 
authoritative readers as Robert Westbrook and Cheryl Misak, Dewey has no epistemic 
argument to speak of, only a broad orientation and a set of hopeful but unsupported 
assertions. Westbrook persuasively suggests that Òone cannot find in DeweyÕs considerable 
logical writings (or elsewhere) an argument that one could call a logical argument for 
democracyÓ.
12
 A recent challenge claims to identify a plausible pragmatist epistemological 
argument for democracy, but argues that DeweyÕs thinking here marks a wrong turn, to be 
distinguished from a more credible account that emanates from C. S. PeirceÕs conception of 
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8
 James Kloppenberg, The Virtues of Liberalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 
p. 90. 
9
 Putnam, Renewing Philosophy, p. 180. 
10
 Anderson, ÒEpistemology and DemocracyÓ: 18. 
11
 Landemore, Democratic Reason, pp. 82-3. 
12
 Robert B. Westbrook, Democratic Hope: The Politics of Truth (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2005), p. 179, emphasis in original. 
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truth.
13
 Misak in her deft and magisterial account of the American pragmatists finds that 
while Dewey offers an epistemic conception of democracy, he Òstruggles in an especially 
pressing wayÓ with explaining the value of this to a skeptic.
14
  
Overlaid on these debates about the identification and validity of an epistemic 
argument in Dewey, there is a set of questions about the political character of this strand in 
this thought. One of the most important earlier lines of criticism of DeweyÕs thought that he 
has a reductive view of political democracy Òon an analogy to the community of scientistsÓ 
with the result that Òissues are defined in objective terms, and there are (in the political sense) 
no interest groups, factions, or social classes passionately asserting their antagonistic 
claimsÓ.
15
 This view of his understanding of democracy fuelled a broader interpretation of 
DeweyÕs political philosophy as the ÒacquiescentÓ fig-leaf for power politics or a blithely 
technocratic philosophy. Recent scholarship has dismantled this technocratic interpretation of 
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13
 For a fuller discussion of this approach, see Cheryl Misak, Truth, Politics, Morality: 
Pragmatism and Deliberation (London: Routledge, 2000); Cheryl Misak, The American 
Pragmatists (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Cheryl Misak and Robert Talisse, 
ÒPragmatist Epistemology and Democratic TheoryÓ, Journal of Political Philosophy, 22 
(2014): 366-76; Matthew Festenstein, ÒDeliberative Democracy and Two Models of 
PragmatismÓ, European Journal of Social Theory, 7 (2004): 291-306.  
14
 Misak, American Pragmatists, p. 136. 
15
 Gale Kennedy, ÒThe Process of Evaluation in a Democratic CommunityÓ, Journal of 
Philosophy, 56 (1959): 256. See also Lewis Mumford, The Golden Day (New York: Horace 
Liveright, 1926); Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and 
Politics (New York: Charles Scribner, 1934); C. Wright Mills, Sociology and Pragmatism: 
The Higher Learning in America (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1969); Sheldon Wolin, 
Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2004), pp. 495-523. 
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DeweyÕs political thought.
16 
 Indeed, important recent interpretations have argued that Dewey 
is a theorist of popular contention Ð of class struggle, strike action, social movements, 
industrial democracy, civil disobedience, and coercive political action.
17
 However, in putting 
the contentious character of DeweyÕs political thinking at the centre of their interpretations 
these authors raise from a different direction the question of the structure and place of 
DeweyÕs epistemic claims. 
Here I want to bring together these debates. The focus of this paper is to shed some 
light on what DeweyÕs pragmatism can bring to thinking about epistemic democracy, and to 
show how his thought addresses the challenges of instrumentalism and depoliticization 
leveled by critics of the epistemic line of argument. The first step (in the following section) is 
to outline his thinking about the relationship of epistemology and democracy, which I try to 
show consists of four claims in a distinctive nested structure. Running like a thread through 
the epistemic accounts is a critical analysis of the distortion of hierarchy and class division on 
social knowledge, which democracy can counteract. Understanding this structure allows us 
(in section III) to see the shape of a Deweyan response to contemporary concerns about an 
epistemic approach to democracy, partly through an understanding of the relationship 
between the apparently divergent epistemic and ÒcontentiousÓ strands in his thought. The 
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16
 See Robert B. Westbrook, John Dewey and American Democracy (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1991), Alan Ryan, John Dewey and the High Tide of American Liberalism 
(New York: Norton, 1995), Matthew Festenstein, Pragmatism and Political Theory 
(Cambridge: Polity, 1997).  
17
 Marc Stears, Demanding Democracy: American Radicals in Search of a New Politics 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010); Jeffrey Jackson, ÒDividing Deliberative and 
Participatory Democracy Through John DeweyÓ, Democratic Theory, 2 (2015): 63-84; John 
Medearis, Why Democracy is Oppositional (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015); 
Alex Livingston, ÒBetween Means and Ends: Reconstructing Coercion in DeweyÕs 
Democratic TheoryÓ, American Political Science Review, 111 (2017): 522-34. 
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gloomy conviction of the stratified character of capitalist societies and the conflictual 
character of their politics shapes his view of political agency, and IÕll outline below how his 
epistemic conception of democracy is deployed as a critical standard for judging and 
transforming existing political forms but also acts as a line of defence for democratic politics. 
A few broad orienting points are in order. The approach here is blatantly 
reconstructive. It isnÕt difficult to find statements throughout DeweyÕs voluminous oeuvre 
that support the idea that he believes that there is a significant connection between 
epistemological and wider social and political questions. For instance, he assures us that we 
can only understand democracy through the lens of his conception of inquiry: Ò[d]emocracy 
is estimable only through the changed conception of intelligence that forms modern 
scienceÓ.
18
 At the same time, Òthe theory of inquiryÓ isnÕt a matter of only philosophical 
significance but should Òassume and hold a position of primary human importanceÓ.
19
 Yet 
what Dewey has to say about this relationship is scattered widely and is not the subject of a 
single unified treatment. Many of his discussions of politics are occasional and may be best 
understood with reference to the specific context in which they were written. And there are 
very important differences among different phases of his work that IÕll gloss over here 
(although there is no discussion of his earliest, heavily idealist-influenced philosophy, and the 
focus is on his later work). The discussion here picks its way through this contextual detail in 
order to block out a broader set of arguments in DeweyÕs work about the epistemic capacities 
of democracy, and how this relates to some of the other values he thinks important to this 
idea.  
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18
 John Dewey, ÒIntelligence and MoralsÓ, in The Middle Works of John Dewey, vol. 4, ed. Jo 
Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1983), p. 39. 
19
 John Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, in The Later Works of John Dewey, vol. 12, ed 
Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1986), p. 527. 
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The language of ÒepistemicÓ, ÒcognitiveÓ, ÒepistemologicalÓ, etc., although IÕll use it 
here, does not fit comfortably with much of DeweyÕs own usage. Dewey seeks to offer an 
account of belief formation against the backdrop of a wider field of human practical 
involvement. Epistemic concepts play a role against the background of DeweyÕs practical 
conceptions of experience, intelligence and inquiry. His scepticism about Òthe epistemology 
industryÓ (as opposed to knowledge) along with related deformations such as the 
Òintellectualist biasÓ stems from a sense that dominant ways of thinking about belief and 
knowledge detach these from this background, and he develops (and redevelops) a 
vocabulary that he thinks will be less prone to this bias. 
  
II. The structure of DeweyÕs epistemic argument  
Dewey offers a number of different pictures of the relationship of epistemic values and 
democracy, which we can gather under four headings. Each makes a distinct claim, resting on 
independent grounds, for an epistemic claim on behalf of democracy. At the same time, I 
want to show how the succession of claims here is cumulative, in the sense that the later 
claims (in my presentation) include the earlier ones.  These points also fit together, IÕll try to 
show, as different components in his overall naturalized picture of inquiry.  
I also want to show how each of these claims deploys a slightly different conception 
of democracy. DeweyÕs conception of democracy is notoriously idiosyncratic. While it is 
commonplace to think of Dewey as distinctively the theorist of democracy as Òmore than a 
form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated 
experienceÓ, this idea takes different forms in different places in his democratic thinking.
 20
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20
 John Dewey, Democracy and Education, in The Middle Works of John Dewey, vol. 9, ed. 
Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1980), p. 93. It is 
ÒsuperficialÓ to think that Ògovernment is located in Washington and Albany. There is 
government in the family, in business, in the church, in every social groupÓ which regulates 
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Further, while Dewey refers rather scathingly in contrast to a conception of democracy as 
mere ÒmachineryÓ for decision-making, he is committed to improving this machinery rather 
than merely dismissing it as unimportant. The real target of his ire is the identification of 
democracy exclusively with a current set of political institutions, particularly only with 
elections and majority rule. He thinks that this contains an inbuilt conservative bias that 
prevents more imaginative institutional thinking: indeed, subverting an assumption 
commonly attributed to him, he says that the Òold sayingÓ that the cure for the ills of 
democracy is more democracy is Ònot aptÓ if by this is meant introducing more machinery of 
the same kind that already exists.
21
  
 
[i] Pragmatic self-contradiction. The most prominent example of this line of thought is 
DeweyÕs argument in The Public and Its Problems against Walter LippmannÕs defence of 
Òthe responsible administratorÓ as epistemically superior to the befuddled general citizen.
22
 
Against this, Dewey argues that the claim for the epistemic superiority of an expert class, 
when it is closed off from contestation and correction through democratic debate, is self-
defeating: Òin the absence of an articulate voice on the part of the masses, the best do not and 
cannot remain the best, the wise cease to be wise É In the degree to which they become a 
specialized class, they are shut off from knowledge of the needs which they are supposed to 
serveÓ. So the merit of even the existing ÒrudimentaryÓ form of democracy is that it Òcompels 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
the behaviour of its members (John Dewey, ÒDemocracy and Educational AdministrationÓ, 
Later Works, p. 221).   
21
 John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems, in The Later Works of John Dewey, vol. 2, ed. J 
Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984), p. 325; John Dewey 
and James H. Tufts, Ethics, second edition, in The Later Works of John Dewey, vol. 7, ed. Jo 
Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1985), pp. 333-4. 
22
 Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York: Free Press, 1965); Walter Lippmann, The 
Phantom Public (New York: MacMillan, 1925). 
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É recourse to methods of discussion, consultation and persuasionÓ, and in doing so provides 
the opportunity to improve decisions.
 23
 
The epistemic standards that purportedly govern a technocratic eliteÕs epistemic 
mission are in pragmatic conflict with the exclusion of those whose needs they are supposed 
to serve. To the extent that epistemically superior outcomes tend to emerge from processes of 
open and inclusive challenge, discussion and consultation, an epistemic elite needs to bind 
itself to these processes. And democracy provides the best institutional conditions for this, 
through institutionalizing Òeffective guarantees of free inquiry, free assembly and free 
communicationÓ as well as ways of holding rulers to account and of informing them of their 
mistakes.
24
  
Although well-known, this argument has a relatively narrow scope. It appeals only to 
the Òresponsible administratorÓ seeking to benefit from democratic engagement in allowing 
her to achieve self-avowed goals of understanding public needs. The end-in-view, knowledge 
of public needs, canÕt be achieved without engagement and participation of those whose 
needs are at issue. So this first line of argument isnÕt intended for a person or institution 
lacking a commitment to these goals. It is also worth noting that this is only an instrumental 
defence of democracy in its ÒmachineÓ sense: political machinery has a value since it fosters 
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23
 Dewey, Public, p. 364. Specialists Òrepresent a social division of labor; and their 
specialization can be trusted only when such persons are in unobstructed cooperation with 
other social occupations, sensitive to othersÕ problems and transmitting results to them for 
wider application in actionÓ (John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, in The Middle 
Works of John Dewey, vol. 12, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois 
University Press, 1982), p. 164). 
24
 John Dewey, ÒCreative Democracy Ð The Task before UsÓ, in The Later Works of John 
Dewey, vol. 14, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1988), 
pp. 224Ð230. See also Dewey, Public, pp. 290-3, 364-6; Anderson, ÒEpistemology and 
DemocracyÓ.  
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consultation and debate, which in turn allows for the expression of wider public interests.  
 
[ii] Epistemic costs of hierarchy. This first idea [i] is nested within DeweyÕs general view of 
the epistemic dangers of hierarchy and privilege: Ò[s]uch social divisions as interfere with 
free and full intercourse react to make intelligence and knowing of members of the separated 
classes one-sidedÓ.
25
 This is a wider claim about the distorting impact of social power than [i] 
since it focuses not only on a self-proclaimed epistemic eliteÕs claim to technical authority 
but on social privilege and disadvantage more generally. The claim here is not only that one 
group fails to meet its own epistemic standards but that the worldview of different classes is 
distorted, irrespective of how it views its own epistemic mission; that this distortion stems 
from the power relations and related inequalities of distribution among these classes; and that 
democracy, in DeweyÕs sense, counters this distortion.  
Dewey presents some different reasons for this conclusion. One is that absence of 
Òfree and full intercourseÓ limits experience and opportunities to learn from one another.
26
 
Behind this, though, is a recognition that this ÒseparationÓ often expresses or reproduces a 
structure of hierarchy and disadvantage. The inequitable distribution of power excludes many 
from epistemic resources. This may flow from censorship and propaganda but can just as 
effectively arise from informal market pressures: Ò[p]eople may be shut out from free access 
to ideas simply because of preoccupation of their time and energy [É] because of class 
barriers and because a limited minority group holds a virtual monopoly of whole ranges of 
ideas and of knowledge [É] It requires a common background of common experiences and 
of common desires to bring about this free distribution of knowledgeÓ.
27
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25
 Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 354. 
26
 E.g., Dewey, Democracy and Education, pp. 354-5. 
27
 John Dewey, ÒPolitics and CultureÓ, in The Later Works of John Dewey, vol. 6, ed. Jo Ann 
Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1985), p. 41.  
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ItÕs also the case that membership of a privileged class is epistemically distorting for 
its members: Òall special privilege narrows the outlook of those who possess it, as well as 
limits the possibilities of development of those not having itÓ.
28
 An important symptom of 
this for Dewey are the ideological justifications generated by dominant groups to explain 
their superior position. Privilege makes it difficult to resist the temptation to develop, and 
accept as true, self-serving justifications of this status: Ò[t]he intellectual blindness caused by 
privileged and monopolistic possession is made evident in ÔrationalizationÕ of the misery and 
cultural degradation of others which attend its existence. These are asserted to be the fault of 
those who suffer; to be the consequence of their own improvidence, lack of industry, wilful 
ignorance, etc.Ó.
29
 In other words, the self-serving prejudices of the privileged classes are 
held in place not only by ÒseparationÓ Ð the absence of any challenge or alternative 
perspective on inherited beliefs Ð but by their function in supporting this privilege. Social 
hierarchies reproduce themselves in knowledge hierarchies, which in turn support the social 
hierarchy. DeweyÕs well-known analysis of the history of philosophy in terms of the contrast 
between the knowledge of a leisurely theoretical class and practical knowledge is a further 
example of this line of thought.
30
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28
 Dewey and Tufts, Ethics, p. 347. 
29
 Dewey and Tufts, Ethics, pp. 347-8; Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 90. This 
anticipates some aspects of the concern with epistemic injustice: Medina, Epistemology of 
Resistance; Susan Dielman, ÒRealism, Pragmatism and Critical Social EpistemologyÓ, in 
Pragmatism and Justice, ed. Susan Dieleman, David Rondel and Christopher Voparil (New 
York: Oxford University Press), pp. 129-43; Paul Taylor, ÒAn Aesthetics of Resistance: 
Deweyan Experimentalism and Epistemic InjusticeÓ, in Pragmatism and Justice, ed. 
Dieleman, Rondel and Voparil, pp. 215-30. 
30
 For example, John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, in The Later Works of John Dewey, 
vol. 2, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984), p. 4: 
ÒThe depreciation of action, of doing and making, has been cultivated by philosophers. But 
while philosophers have perpetuated the derogation by formulating and justifying it, they did 
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Democracy is sometimes identified by Dewey with the overcoming of this separation. 
In texts such as Democracy and Education, democratic society is viewed as constituted by 
free interaction or Òconjoint communicated experienceÓ. It is the Òbreaking down of those 
barriers of class, race and national territory that kept men from perceiving the full import of 
their activityÓ, countering the distortion that flows from social separation by removing the 
obstacles of class, status and identity to mutual learning.
31
 It doesnÕt guarantee that this 
learning in fact takes place but provides conditions under which it can. Why does democracy 
have this effect? One response is that there is nothing to be said in a general way about the 
mechanisms at work here: there are only the specific analyses of particular distortions in 
context.
32
 However, the generality of DeweyÕs formulations (Òall special privilegeÉÓ) 
suggest that this isnÕt his view. The claim about the epistemic distortions of hierarchy and 
privilege need to be seen as nested in his wider conception of inquiry and democratic 
interaction.  
 
[iii] Democratic conditions of inquiry. ÒThe very heart of political democracy is adjudication 
of social differences by discussion and exchange of viewsÓ, Dewey writes in a late essay. 
ÒThis method provides a rough approximation to the method of effecting change by means of 
experimental inquiry and testÓ.
33
 To understand the force and scope of this claim, we need to 
sketch out some key features of DeweyÕs conception of experimental inquiry. These are 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
not originate it. They glorified their own office without a doubt in placing theory so much 
above practice. But independently of their attitude, many things conspired to the same 
effectÉÓ 
31
 Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 93, 354-5.  
32
 Gregory Pappas, ÒThe PragmatistsÕ Approach to InjusticeÓ, The Pluralist, 11 (2016): 58-
77. 
33
 John Dewey, ÒChallenge to Liberal ThoughtÓ, in The Later Works of John Dewey, vol. 15, 
ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1989), p. 273. i  
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articulated in various ways at different points but some important elements can be 
highlighted. 
Now Dewey doesnÕt (as far as I can make out) say that democracies are like scientific 
communities, although this is a popular view among a wide range of interpreters. Rather in 
outline his position can be sketched as follows:  
[1] In inquiry, we aim to solve problems.  
[2] To be successful, this should be done experimentally.  
[3] Conducting inquiry experimentally requires democracy, in his sense.  
[4] So there is a reason to support democracy, grounded in the conditions for successful 
inquiry. 
Let me consider these points in more detail, particularly the third.  
Regarding [1], DeweyÕs basic move is to see our important epistemic relationship to 
the world as inquiry, and to view inquiry as a form of action or practice carried out by an 
agent.
34
 We engage in inquiry as part of an existential struggle to cope with a precarious but 
improvable environment. Experience flows until a problematic situation is encountered or 
identified: then ideas, experiments, and the obstacle circumvented or direction changed. 
Inquiry is demanded by what he calls an incomplete situation; that is, one in which something 
must be done, as a response to precarious, unstable and uncertain conditions: Òwe are 
doubtful because the situation is inherently doubtfulÓ.
35
 Inquiry is needed in order to define 
the specific problem that the situation presents and to re-establish in accordance with human 
purposes the provisional equilibrium which earlier held.  Accordingly, he defines it as a 
practical project, Òthe controlled and directed transformation of an indeterminate situation 
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into one that is so determinate in its constituent distinctions as to convert the elements of the 
original situation into a unified wholeÓ.
36
 Practical deliberation is integrated into this 
conception of inquiry. Practical judgments (about choice of career, whether or not to get 
married, which political party to support) can be better or worse as ways of identifying and 
solving problems. A value is ÒconstructedÓ as a solution to a problem in experience, and can 
be appraised by assessing the extent to which it solves the problem. 
 Turning to [2], DeweyÕs key claim is that success in inquiry requires a radical 
openness on the part of inquirers. We hold some presuppositions of inquiry Ð methods, 
practices, standards Ð fixed in order to identify a problem and arrive at a determinate solution. 
But inquiry requires a thoroughgoing fallibilism, a preparedness to consider reasons for and 
against any belief or presupposition. A constitutive condition of inquiry from this pragmatist 
perspective is the openness of its claims and standards to testing against experience: 
Ò[a]dherence to any body of doctrines and dogmas based upon a specific authority signifies 
distrust in the power of experience to provide, in its own ongoing movement, the needed 
principles of belief and actionÓ.
37
  
For Dewey, then, the step to [3] rests on identifying this openness with a conception 
of democracy: Ò[d]emocracy is the faith that the process of experience is more important than 
any special result attained, so that special results achieved are only of ultimate value as they 
are used to enrich and order the ongoing processÓ.
38
 In this sense, democracy is understood as 
consisting in and as providing the conditions for experimental inquiry. Robust inquiry 
requires that we must have access to evidence, arguments, other forms of information, and 
processes of reason-exchange. If we want our inquiry to be successful, we should not 
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prejudge its outcomes, by excluding sources of experience that allow us to explore and 
correct our hypotheses. By contrast: 
Every authoritarian scheme, on the contrary, assumes that its value may be assessed 
by some prior principle, if not of family and birth or race and color or possession of 
material wealth, then by the position and rank the person occupies in the existing 
social scheme. The democratic faith in equality is the faith that each individual shall 
have the chance and opportunity to contribute whatever he is capable of contributing, 
and that the value of his contribution be decided by its place and function in the 
organized total of similar contributions: -- not on the basis of prior status of any kind 
whatever.
39
  
  Social and political values are themselves not fixed standards but revisable 
hypotheses, the implications of which are worked through in practice and which are judged in 
the light of their consequences in the widest sense for everyone involved. In order to identify 
and solve problems we need to have in place the conditions for problem-solving. Democratic 
institutions and culture, including security of a range of individual rights for all, provide the 
best social conditions for this, because at least in principle they allow for openness, epistemic 
diversity, experiment, contestation and revision.
40
 Hierarchy and snobbery undermine this 
constitutive commitment to openness, like epistemological fixity, since they prejudice 
thinking about social problems.  
ItÕs an important feature of DeweyÕs thinking here that this conception of inquiry 
doesnÕt assume that there is a determinate solution available in all cases.
41
 Indeed, he 
highlights differences of opinion as well as conflicts of interest and value pluralism as 
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ineliminable features of social and political life. Even when his epistemological standards are 
adhered to, Ò[d]ifferences of opinion in the sense of differences of judgment as to the course 
which it is best to follow, the policy which it is best to try out, will still existÓ.
42
 A heritage of 
conflicting ethical traditions also presents an obstacle to shared social criteria for problem-
solving. These tensions among different ethical outlooks cannot be resolved in theory Ð only 
in practice, if at all, where an agent must make Òthe best adjustment he can among forces 
which are genuinely disparateÓ.
43
 IÕll return to the character and significance of this emphasis 
on pluralism and conflict in section III. 
 
[iv] The democratic ideal. This fourth step is rooted in what Dewey calls an ÒidealÓ 
conception of democracy as self-rule. He often refers to this as an ideal or generic idea of 
democracy. Dewey thinks of the democrat, in this sense, as hypothesizing that individual 
self-development and collective self-determination go together, and using this as a critical 
standard to appraise social and political conditions: Òfrom an ethical point of viewÓ, Dewey 
says, Òthe democratic ideal poses, rather than solves, the great problem: How to harmonize 
the development of each individual with the maintenance of a social state in which the 
activities of one will contribute to the good of all the othersÓ.
44 
An ideal, in DeweyÕs sense, is 
a hypothesis formed in non-ideal circumstances which suggests possibilities for action and 
for how our values may relate to one another. Ideals set out ÒvisionsÓ, understood as 
possibilities to be experimentally tested and explored, but they do not specify the specific 
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goals (Deweyan ends-in-view) that we work to. For this line of argument, the epistemic value 
of democratic participation rests on DeweyÕs specific ethical hypothesis, which he thinks is 
shared by those who share the democratic ideal. 
For this ideal, the democratic criterion as a test of social institutions Òdemands the full 
development of individuals in their distinctive individualityÓ.
45
 Democracy Òsignifies, on one 
side, that every individual is to share in the duties and rights belonging to control of social 
affairs, and on the other side, that social arrangements are to eliminate those external 
arrangements of status, birth, wealth, sex, etc., which restrict the opportunity of each 
individual for full development of himselfÓ.
46
 This argument then has the following shape. A 
personÕs freedom or individuality involves her having a regard for those conditions and 
objects which permit other members of the democratic community freely to exercise their 
own powers from their own initiative, reflection and choice. This involves Òsympathetic 
regard for the intelligence of others, even if they hold views opposed to oursÓ, the search for 
Òthings which unite men in common endsÓ and Òintegration of [É] divided purposes and 
conflicts of beliefÓ.
47
 Being required to follow this rule, or attend to this regard, is a condition 
of self-development for the democrat, not a constraint upon it.  
Blocking some people from inclusion on equal terms is not only (as in [i]) the cause 
of epistemic failure, standing in the way of accessing a procedure-independent interest. It is 
also constitutive of that blockage, since it subverts the possibility of participation on 
democratic terms, and in doing so frustrates access to the common regard that is needed for 
my self-development on these terms.
48
 Epistemic inclusion is a condition of democratic 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
45
 Dewey and Tufts, Ethics, p. 348. 
46
 Ibid., pp. 348-9; cf. Dewey, Public, pp. 328-9. 
47
 Dewey and Tufts, Ethics, p. 329; Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 98. 
48
 ÒThere is a moral tragedy inherent in efforts to further the common good which prevent the 
result from being either good or common Ð not good, because it is at the expense of the active 
! 19 
participation and so part of the democratic ideal, in DeweyÕs sense. 
The claim that self-development in the relevant sense is important and that this 
common regard is necessary for it is open to a well-known ethical challenge to this kind of 
approach: why does my self-development require this? Why canÕt it be at the expense of 
others? There is certainly some evidence to support an interpretation of Dewey as rather 
bluntly stipulating that individual ÒgrowthÓ is somehow lacking or stunted in the absence of 
this common concern. So, for example, he says that Òa member of a robber band may express 
his powers in a way consonant with belonging to that group and be directed by the interest 
common to its members. But he does so only at the cost of repression of those of his 
potentialities which can be realized only through membership in other groupsÓ.
49
 Now 
Dewey here isnÕt just helping himself to a moralized conception of self-development. He 
doesnÕt imagine that the idea of self-development at the expense of others is nonsensical: 
Ò[t]hat a man may grow in efficiency as a burglar, as a gangster, as a corrupt politician cannot 
be doubtedÓ.
50
 Rather, his point is that forms of self-development that exclude or oppress 
others conflict with the democratic ideal: the Deweyan conception of individual growth in 
democratic society doesnÕt aspire to be ethically neutral but is framed within the terms of this 
ideal. If I assert that engaging with others on terms of equality is repugnant to my own goals 
and values (or frustrates my capacities as a corrupt politician or gangster), Dewey isnÕt 
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seeking to show that from some ethically neutral standpoint my capacities are better served 
by my adopting a democratic view of self-development.  
    
III. Instrumentalism and depoliticization 
With this understanding of the structure of DeweyÕs epistemic claims about democracy in 
place, I want to turn to the resources that he gives us to understand and address the more 
general concerns about an epistemic approach to democracy, focusing on the two challenges 
of instrumentalism and depoliticization directed at epistemic accounts by democratic critics.  
First, the exclusive concern with the epistemic quality of decisions means that 
democratic procedures are valued only instrumentally as mechanisms for achieving this 
outcome. However, we value democratic participation for other reasons too: as a non-
instrumental expression of equal respect or as instrumental for achieving other values (e.g., 
autonomy, individual welfare). The demands of an epistemic conception of democracy clash 
with those of other conceptions and have perverse anti-democratic consequences. For 
example, if democracy is viewed as having at its core a commitment to equal respect for each 
citizen, this seems to conflict with the requirements of a search for truth, which may call for 
deference to the superior knowledge of experts.
51
 These undemocratic implications make the 
account of democratic decision-making politically vulnerable in principle to a technocratic 
move: privileging the value of the ÒcorrectnessÓ of the outputs of decisions can provide 
grounds to exclude some citizens from input into decisions if it is judged that their 
participation may dilute the epistemic quality of the decisions.
52
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At a general level, as is well known, Dewey is skeptical about the distinction between 
somethingÕs being good in itself and merely instrumentally good, at least if this is more than 
a functional distinction drawn for a particular purpose.
53
 Indeed, he thinks of this distinction 
as a hangover of a primitive state of society in which slaves did the instrumentally necessary 
work while a leisured class pursued the good for its own sake. So we shouldnÕt accept a 
dichotomy between thinking of democracy as good in itself (because it expresses equal 
respect or allows for the equal contribution of all, as in his democratic ideal [iv]) or as good 
only for its effects (because it allows for or fosters better epistemic outcomes, for example). 
The distinction makes sense when identifying and solving problems; that is, from the 
perspective of particular agents working out what is going on and what to do (if your bicycle 
breaks you have a problem that needs solving about the instrumental means of achieving the 
end of getting to work this morning). But the standard of success here is always contextual, 
as weÕve seen: it solves the problem that is confronted. And our ends (e.g., the value of your 
being at work) are open to critical appraisal, in part in the light of what we know about the 
means needed to achieve them. The radical openness of inquiry, spanning means and ends, is 
set up to avoid the instrumentalism objection. 
Taken in isolation, what IÕve called DeweyÕs pragmatic self-contradiction argument 
[i] seems vulnerable to this concern: in that argument, participation is understood as a means 
of providing epistemic access to popular interests. So we may think that in principle there 
could be some alternative way of finding out what those interests are, a possibility which 
summons up the worry expressed by Urbinati and others. But, as weÕve seen, that is only one 
argument, and a slightly atypical one in its content and scope for Dewey Ð directed at 
showing the residual benefits of democratic Òpolitical machineryÓ for keeping technocrats in 
line. It is misleading to look at this in isolation as it should be seen as embedded in the wider 
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context of [ii]-[iv]. Dewey wants to show how any move to a knowledge hierarchy is self-
subverting [ii], that aspirations to inquiry contain a constitutive democratic element in his 
sense [iii], and that self-government on democratic terms requires epistemic inclusion. 
The other objection to epistemic democracy that I want to consider is that it 
depoliticizes democracy. From this perspective, to view democracy as a form of social 
inquiry or a collective effort intelligently to address social problems glosses over democratic 
politics as a site of power, contention, resistance and conflicting interests and identities. This, 
as weÕve seen, is also a well-established line of criticism of Deweyan democracy.  
Now for Dewey existing democratic societies are not communities of inquiry. 
Democratic politics is not pictured as eliminating conflict but as a space in which conflicts 
can be discussed and resolved: ÒOf course, there are conflicting interests; otherwise there 
would be no social problems [É] The method of democracy Ð inasfar as it is that of 
organized intelligence Ð is to bring these conflicts out into the open where their special claims 
can be seen and appraised, where they can be discussed and judged in the light of more 
inclusive interests than are represented by either of them separatelyÓ.
54
 This is not a given 
state of affairs but one that needs to be continually fought for in the face of opposition: Òthe 
struggle for democracy has to be maintained on as many fronts as culture has aspects: 
political, economic, international, educational, scientific, and artistic, religiousÓ.
55
 
Furthermore, as noted above, a number of commentators have drawn attention to DeweyÕs 
support for more radical forms of democratic participation and action, including his activities 
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on behalf of groups such as the League for Industrial Democracy.
56
 ÒTo form itselfÓ, he 
writes, Òthe public has to break existing political forms. This is hard to do because these 
forms are themselves the regular means of instituting political changeÓ.
57
 This more 
contentious streak in his political thinking includes his support for industrial democracy, for 
industrial action (including notably the 1894 Pullman workersÕ strike in Chicago), activities 
to develop more radical alternative political parties.
58
 In opposition to the struggle for 
democracy powerful groups are ruthless in their efforts to rig the political agenda and to 
control thought and speech.
59
 Although better than authoritarian alternatives, Òdiscussion and 
dialecticÓ are Òweak reedsÓ to rely on Òif the problem of social organization is to be metÓ.
60
 
Stears, Jackson, and Livingston each quote this last passage, arguing that there is a tension 
between this dimension of DeweyÕs thinking and the interpretation of Dewey as a proponent 
of social inquiry.  
Rounding out our picture of DeweyÕs conception of politics in this way doesnÕt in 
itself address the objection to an epistemic view of democracy, of course, but only pushes the 
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problem back. In particular, we may think, donÕt these two pictures suggest different 
requirements for political actors? A full answer to this would require a more detailed 
exploration both of the various ways in which the character of the political is defined in order 
to support this criticism (agonist, realist, pluralist, and so on) and, of course, an investigation 
into the various ways in which politics is envisaged across DeweyÕs extensive and varied 
corpus: his sympathies change, he writes for different audiences in different genres at 
different times, some of his political activities and commitments are Òincompletely 
theorizedÓ.
61
 
Here I want to explore one important systematic way of identifying and addressing 
this apparent dissonance, for the light it sheds on DeweyÕs account. LetÕs start by considering 
Marc StearsÕs argument that we can reconcile these two views of democratic politics through 
distinguishing non-ideal and ideal theory Ð between whatÕs required as a tactical and political 
matter to achieve the conditions for social inquiry and a moral ideal of social and political 
inquiry in ideal conditions.
 
Dewey Òseparated the long-term goal of a communicative 
democracy Ð to which he remained resolutely committed Ð from a short-term political 
strategy suitable for a Depression-era America that emphasized a series of distinctly non-
deliberative approaches to the ongoing struggleÓ. At a non-ideal level, democrats should be 
concerned with establishing the conditions for a well-functioning democracy: but this may 
involve Òadversarial, manipulative, and even coerciveÓ action.
62
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As weÕve seen in relation to argument [iv] above, while DeweyÕs relationship to the 
ideal/non-ideal distinction (itself multifaceted) is complex, there is an important space for the 
ideals in DeweyÕs theory.
63
 However, DeweyÕs epistemic arguments arenÕt presented as 
blueprints of ideal epistemic conditions but as tools for identifying sources of epistemic 
failure in actual conditions. The first three epistemic arguments aim to provide critical 
leverage on non-ideal conditions Ð at technocratic claims [i], knowledge hierarchies [ii], and 
epistemic exclusion [iii]. In the case of [iv], the democratic ideal is also proposed as a critical 
tool for application in non-ideal circumstances. How we use these standards, including 
working out how they sit alongside our other needs and values, is the problem for us as 
agents in a precarious environment, acting on and shaping ourselves within uncertain 
conditions, with no guarantee of a successful outcome. From this perspective, there is no 
prospect of a general theoretical reconciliation of politics as conflict and as inquiry as types, 
only the practical project of identifying and solving problems. It seems a mistake, then, to 
align ideal theory (in this sense) with a blueprint for ideal circumstances, when it seems to be 
intended as a tool for critical engagement in non-ideal actuality. 
Further, Dewey also suggests that these epistemic commitments offer a counterweight 
to forces that erode or eliminate politics.  Of course, politics can lapse into Ò[d]ogmatism, 
reinforced by the weight of unquestioned custom and tradition, the disguised or open play of 
class interests, dependence on brute force and violenceÓ, as he writes in response to Reinhold 
Niebuhr.
64
 However, experimentalism provides an alternative: 
There is an undoubted objective clash of interests between finance-capitalism that 
controls the means of production and whose profit is served by maintaining relative 
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scarcity, and idle workers and hungry consumers. But what generates violent strife is 
failure to bring the conflict into the light of intelligence where the conflicting interests 
can be adjudicated in behalf of the interest of the great majority. Those most 
committed to the dogma of inevitable force recognize the need for discovering and 
expressing the dominant social interest up to a certain point and then draw back. The 
ÒexperimentalistÓ is one who would see to it that the method depended upon by all in 
some degree in every democratic community be followed through to completion.
65
 
The contribution of experimentalism is epistemic, the discovery and expression of the 
dominant social interest, but doesnÕt in itself resolve the clash of interests. This end-in-view, 
though, is a means to a further end, keeping politics political, as it were Ð it stops politics 
sliding into mere violence or coercion. Of course, there are no guarantees of success in this, 
nor is it the case that violence and coercion can always be avoided. But itÕs important that 
Dewey sees experimentalism as a bulwark against the collapse of political relationships into 
authoritarianism, dogma and violence.   
 
IV. Conclusions 
In the light of recent debates, IÕve argued that a systematic epistemic account of democracy 
can be reconstructed from DeweyÕs writings, with a distinctive nested structure. Further, IÕve 
sketched how this can defuse at least some important forms of the broader charges of 
instrumentalism and depoliticization that are directed at the epistemic project. This account 
operates at a very abstract level, in spite of DeweyÕs regular engagement in specific polemics: 
it is developed in relation to both his very distinctive and idiosyncratic view of democracy as 
a necessarily unfinished and radically open social project of breaking old forms and making 
new ones, of the contextual character of value, and of human inquiry as form of agency. This 
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last point is worth emphasizing, as it suggests we should be cautious about trying to extract 
Òlessons from DeweyÓ to address contemporary theoretical problems, while glossing over the 
wider commitments that support his position. The genealogy of epistemic democracy may be 
stranger Ð or at least less familiar Ð as well as richer, than its contemporary proponents and 
detractors maintain.  
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